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Philosophers concerned with self-understanding have often conceived of it as 
either a matter of immediate, unchallengeable introspective awareness or as a 
matter of gathering evidence about oneself scientifically and impersonally. In 
contrast, Gilbert Ryle rightly understood self-understanding as knowledge of 
one’s own commitments, desires, beliefs, wishes, and fears––all things that one 
has some share in forming and can to some extent alter. What Ryle misses or 
underplays, however, is the extent to which the forming and revising of 
commitments, desires, beliefs, wishes, and fears are also social processes, as 
agents-in-formation are subject to the gazes, expectations, and evaluations of 
others. Jane Austen grasped all this very well, and in Emma she gives us a 
picture of Emma’s partial, emotion-laden, and socially inflected—but also 
genuine—achievement of self-understanding from which we might do well to 
learn.
Keywords:   self-understanding, introspection, evidence, Ryle, emotion, social, Austen, Wollheim
On the first page of the novel, we are told that Emma Woodhouse, though 
“handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition,” 
also suffers from the “real evils” of possessing “the power of having rather too 
much her own way, and a disposition to think a little too well of herself.” These 
evils constitute, we are further told, a “danger . . . at present . . . unperceived” 
both to her own enjoyments and to the enjoyments of others (5). This danger is 
then consistently realized throughout the novel, as Emma repeatedly acts out 
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her dispositions to fantasy and self-centeredness by meddlesomely and ineptly 
scripting the affairs of others. The catalogue of her errors includes at least her 
attempt to match Harriett to Mr. Elton, her vanity-feeding insults to Miss Bates 
on Box Hill, her flirtations with Frank Churchill, her imagining an affair between 
Jane Fairfax and Mr. Dixon, and her misunderstanding the objects of Harriett’s 
interest (first Robert Martin, later George Knightley). In each case, what Emma 
is in fact doing—what her actions objectively mean—is not  (p.110) what she 
thinks she is doing, as she mistakenly supposes, variously, that she is being 
helpful to Harriett, amusing her audience, ferreting out secrets, and so on. Jane 
Austen herself famously described Emma as “a heroine whom no one but myself 
will much like.”1 If for many readers that prediction has turned out to be false, it 
is nonetheless not easy to say why Emma is, after all, likable. One might suppose 
that she learns from her errors and so is educated into being a proper grownup 
with concern for others as well as vivacity, so that she earns her entry into what 
is supposed to be a happy marriage as the seal of completed maturity. But then it 
is not quite clear either how Emma changes or how much—her errors are 
persistent—and it is not clear how any of us ever manage to overcome or to curb 
persistent tendencies to self-centeredness, vanity, and fantasy. Emma’s character 
constitutes, then, in its fitful, incomplete, but genuine development, a study in 
the nature and possibility of self-understanding, for creatures such as us who 
share her tendencies.
Frequently philosophers have conceived of self-understanding as in one way too 
easy (and irrelevant to practical life) or in another way too difficult (and 
alienating from practical life). Within a broadly Cartesian tradition that focuses 
on occurrent thoughts, emotions, and qualitative states, self-understanding, 
conceived as a matter of introspective awareness, is too easy. Surely, it seems, I 
cannot fail to be wrong about what I am currently thinking or feeling (no matter 
how the world itself is): I am thinking about a dancing pink elephant or 
experiencing anger or the taste of lemons if and only if I know that I am doing 
so. Despite appearances, however, this account of self-understanding is open to 
a number of objections. First, I must know what a claim (publicly assessable as 
true or false) or anger at an insult or the taste of a lemon is in order to have such 
forms of awareness,  (p.111) and in order to know these things I must already 
know something about what is in fact true or false in the world, what in fact an 
insult is, and what is in fact a lemon. Absent such kinds of knowledge in general, 
I am left only with a stream of unstructured sensory inputs that lack clear 
discursive representational content.2 Hence introspective knowledge of distinct 
discursive representational contents cannot be primitive and independent of 
knowledge of the world, and about the way the world is I can sometimes be 
wrong. The introspectionist picture of self-understanding mistakenly takes 
knowledge of discursive representational contents to be automatic and infallible.
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Second, this kind of self-knowledge—knowledge of occurrent episodes of 
thinking, feeling, and sensing—is in any case not central to what we care about 
when we care about self-knowledge or self-understanding. Quassim Cassam has 
recently usefully distinguished between trivial self-knowledge, including the 
cases of self-knowledge favored in the introspectionist tradition as well as, for 
example, your awareness “that you are wearing socks,” and substantial self- 
knowledge, that is, “knowledge of your deepest desires, hopes, and fears, 
knowledge of your character, emotions, abilities, and values, and knowledge of 
what makes you happy.”3 Only this latter, substantial form of self-knowledge, 
Cassam rightly insists, is what we care about when we care about self- 
understanding, and it is frequently hard to come by.
In developing his own view, however, Cassam casts self-understanding as both 
too difficult to come by and too impersonal. Drawing on cases of implicit, 
unacknowledged bias, but overgeneralizing from them, Cassam argues that 
substantial  (p.112) self-knowledge “is normally based on evidence and is 
inferential.”4 That is, I must, for example, infer from my behavior that I am 
cowardly, that I desire to eat a peach, or that I love my children. While this view 
has some plausibility in the case of cowardice, it is less plausible as an account 
of desiring peaches or loving children. Surely, it can’t be all that difficult to know 
these things.
Second, the existence of these kinds of facts about oneself is not a matter 
entirely of just how things in the world happen to be, but rather also 
significantly of what I decide on or set myself to do. No doubt I sometimes fail in 
my resolutions, and no doubt I am sometimes unclear about what I have 
resolved, what I am in fact doing, and what motivates my behavior. But that is 
not normally the case. In Matthew Boyle’s elegant phrase, the issues of what I 
have resolved to do, what I am doing, and what I count as my motivations are 
normally “mine to settle.”5 It is significantly up to me to count my peach-eating 
urges as reasons for action (thence to eat a peach) and to count my children as 
to be loved (and so to love them). Yes, there is a significant background of 
feelings and urges that I do not control behind such countings and doings, but I 
am not wholly or even normally the passive victim of them, as if they 
hydraulically moved me to act of their own power.6 Were that so, I would not be 
the agent I normally am in being responsive to complex norms and in taking 
responsibility  (p.113) for what I do (and believe and, in many cases, feel); I 
would instead be deeply alienated from my own practical life.
Yet while this latter, anti-introspectionist view that emphasizes responsibility for 
self and for one’s own stances, epistemic and practical, is surely right, it is also 
easy to overemphasize our volitional power and possibilities of success in 
agentive navigations of our worlds, come what may.7 Where, after all, are the 
boundaries between my normal enough control of my commitments and actions 
in familiar enough cases and my bumbling in one way or another elsewhere? 
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What about all the liabilities to which action is vulnerable that J. L. Austin 
famously noted under the heading of excuses,8 all the things I do out of 
inadvertence, negligence, hastiness, self-centered failure of due consideration, 
or just plain sloppiness?9 Human agents do sometimes get into trouble, do 
sometimes fail to take responsibility effectively for their commitments and thus 
for their actions, and we had better have an account of that as well as an 
account of rational and volitional powers. Emma’s valetudinarian father, Mr. 
Woodhouse, for example, is pretty much unable to take any effective action at 
all; he relies on Emma, especially, to see to the running of the household, while 
his dependence on others, as Richard Jenkyns has noted, in fact disguises a 
rapacious manipulativeness. His genuine surface amiability both masks and 
expresses the unconsciously assumed stance of  (p.114) “a bloodsucker, 
fastened upon his daughter’s flesh,”10 determined to get his own way in matters 
of food, visits, after-dinner entertainments, and, especially, Emma’s marriage, 
which he would block at all costs in order to secure his own care. How are we to 
make sense of cases of alienation from one’s own motivations and actions—their 
dominating oneself rather than vice versa—such as this?
In his fine article on Jane Austen, Gilbert Ryle notes that Austen offers us
an ample, variegated and many-dimensional vocabulary. Her descriptions 
of people mention their tempers, habits, dispositions, moods, inclinations, 
impulses, sentiments, feelings, affections, thoughts, reflections, opinions, 
principles, prejudices, imaginations, and fancies. Her people have or lack 
moral sense, sense of duty, good sense, taste, good-breeding, self- 
command, spirits and good humours; they do or do not regulate their 
imaginations and discipline their tempers. Her people have or lack 
knowledge of their own hearts or their own dispositions; they are or are 
not properly acquainted with themselves; they do or do not practice self- 
examination and soliloquy.11
 (p.115) This is surely right, and Ryle is correct to dwell on and to praise 
Austen’s generosity and complex intelligence in eschewing simplistic moralizing 
and in being concerned with substantial self-knowledge. But Austen’s authorial 
habits of complex, generous presentation and her overall moral sensibility do not 
yet explain, however, how a particularly alienated and un-self-knowing character 
might develop over time. Ryle suggests that “improper solicitude”—Emma’s 
besetting vice—“is actuated by love of power, jealousy, conceit, sentimentality, 
and so on,” that it fails to manifest “genuine good will,” with the result that 
Emma “is not effectively self-critical.”12 This, too, is surely right. But how do 
those failings arise and develop over time?13 What sorts of creatures are we in 
general insofar as we are subject to them, and how might they be overcome, to 
the extent that they can be?
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At one level, the answers to these questions are straightforward. Emma’s absent 
mother, weak father, and indulgent governess have given her, from childhood on, 
again “the power of rather having too much her own way, and a disposition to 
think a little too well of herself” (5). Her meddling and vanity are curbed both 
through the interventions of Knightley and through her experience, guided by 
him, of how she has misunderstood and wronged others. But these answers do 
not yet capture what one might call the phenomenology, texture, or 
psychodynamics of the experience of coming to a degree of increased self- 
understanding that the novel tracks in detail.  (p.116) In particular, how might 
one come to have some imperfect, agentive control over one’s actions, so that 
one is significantly responsible for what one does, while also being alienated 
from one’s commitments, unresponsive to others, and under the sways of 
motives that one has not adequately grasped or assessed? How, that is, can one 
both in some sense know what one is doing and yet also not know? And how, and 
how far, can one change?
In a nice piece of either influence or dramatic irony, the most useful general 
philosophical vocabulary for describing Emma’s errors and subsequent 
development is provided by Ryle in his work on self-understanding.14 Like 
Cassam, Ryle focuses on substantial self-knowledge, or what he calls “self- 
consciousness in [an] enlarged sense”: that is, one’s “estimates of [one’s] own 
qualities of character and intellect”15 that require skill and attention to form 
accurately, well beyond awarenesses of occurrent episodes of qualitative feeling. 
Like Cassam, Ryle also urges that “the sorts of things that I can find out about 
myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, 
and the methods of finding them out are much the same.”16
Unlike Cassam, however, Ryle also notes at least five significant, interrelated 
differences between self-understanding and the understanding of others. (1) 
Self-understanding develops initially (when it develops) out of self-consciousness 
in the narrower sense, that is, out of experiences, especially in early 
adolescence, of embarrassment, anxiety, shyness, and affectation.17 Hence the 
pursuit of apt self-understanding cannot be a dispassionate theoretical inquiry. 
One must confront and evaluate one’s character or personality as it  (p.117) is 
already in development, as one feels oneself to fall under the gaze of others, and 
as one must face up to responsibilities and possibilities for change. (2) “It is 
notorious,” Ryle observes, “that people deceive themselves about their own 
motives”; and “there is one class of persons whose qualities and frames of mind 
are specially difficult to appreciate, namely . . . hypocrites and charlatans, the 
people who pretend to motives and moods and the people who pretend to 
abilities, that is, . . . most of us in some stretches of our lives and . . . some of us 
in most stretches of our lives.”18 One’s own tendencies specifically to hypocrisy, 
charlatanry, and pretense must themselves be confronted and worked through. 
(3) Both pretense and candidness are learned from others. In the development of 
linguistic competence, ego-identity, and discursively structured point-of-view- 
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having, “normal unstudied talk”19 and imitation of it come first; a fall into 
pretense comes second, but is itself required in turn for being forthright as a 
matter of settled commitment. That is, there is a difference between the natural 
openness of expression of a young child whose linguistic behavior is less 
controlled and the specific, controlled sincerity of adult character: “a person 
could not be honest or candid who had never known insincerity or reticence.”20 
(4) Learning to be forthright specifically involves the internalization of an 
authority figure and its skills of character assessment. Self-assessment depends 
upon the assessments of others, carried out by others, that one first imitates and 
participates in, and then only later comes to understand and to practice upon 
oneself.21
 (p.118)
At a certain stage the child discovers the trick of directing higher order 
acts upon his own lower order acts. Having been separately victim and 
author of jokes, coercions, catechisms, criticisms, and mimicries in the 
inter-personal dealings between others and himself, he finds out how to 
play both roles at once. He has listened to stories before, and he has told 
stories before, but now he tells stories to his own enthralled ear. He has 
been detected in insincerities and he has detected the insincerities of 
others, but now he applies the techniques of detection to his own 
insincerities. He finds that he can give orders to himself with such 
authority that he sometimes obeys them even when reluctant to do so. Self- 
suasion and self-dissuasion become more or less effective. He learns in 
adolescence to apply to his own behavior most of those higher order 
methods of dealing with the young that are regularly practiced by 
grownups. He is then said to be growing up.22
(5) Assessment of one’s own motivations, character, and conduct is in principle 
never fully completed. The “I” suffers from what Ryle calls “systematic 
elusiveness,” as we never fully succeed in understanding ourselves. “Self- 
commentary, self-ridicule, and self-admonition are logically condemned to 
eternal penultimacy,” insofar as “my commentary on my performances must 
always be silent about one performance, namely itself.”23
To these five points of Ryle’s—the rootedness of self-consciousness in 
embarrassment and anxiety, the standing possibility of self-deception, 
forthrightness in avowal and assessment as a skill  (p.119) learned from others, 
the role of others as internalized authorities, and the in principle incompleteness 
of self-assessment—we can add two further points that Richard Wollheim nicely 
makes. (6) There are typically specific occasioning circumstances for self- 
assessment. In various ways, the smooth formation of intentions to act on the 
basis of beliefs and desires and the subsequent smooth carrying out of these 
intentions can be disrupted. The relevant beliefs and desires may be incoherent, 
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so that no intention is formed, or an occasion for action is missed, or an 
intention is executed but no satisfaction results. In such cases, as Wollheim puts 
it, a “person is required to ask himself a question about his desires and beliefs— 
a question which would never have arisen in the course of the unreflective 
life. . . . And this self-interrogation, once it has begun, has no natural 
termination.”24 (7) There is a particular danger that one’s self-assessments may 
be distorted by what Wollheim calls crystallization—the tendency of a disposition 
to persist by reinforcing itself, as one rationalizes it and shrinks from change, as 
especially in experiences of “envy, hatred, superstition, and the love of 
gambling,” though more happily also in love and friendship. In having 
motivational force, many occurrent emotional states tend “to reinforce the 
dispositions they manifest.”25 As a result, change is not easy, and it can require 
shocks or breakdowns to motivate active and more accurate self-assessment.
Critics have focused on Emma’s path toward increased self-understanding, 
noting both its general character and its more specific occasions and contents. 
Karin Jackson describes the general progress of the novel as a matter of Emma’s 
movement
 (p.120)
from delusion to self-recognition, from illusion to reality; numerous images 
of sight and blindness reinforce this—the lack of sight, the necessity of 
insight. Emma’s “blindness” to the real nature of Mr. Elton, of Harriet, 
Robert Martin, Jane Fairfax, Frank Churchill, Mr. Knightley, and of course 
herself, shows her unknowing errors of judgment, her fundamental lack of 
self-understanding. She is deceived as to the nature of the world around 
her, as well as to the nature of her own emotions. When the truth of human 
situations and feelings is not perceived accurately, disorder and 
unhappiness result.26
George Justice describes the class inflection of Emma’s initial errors, noting she 
must “unlearn some of the vulgar categorizing of Mrs. Elton—[who cares only 
about money—] while preserving belief in the value of traditional social 
relations,” wherein the upper classes, at least, “are judged on the basis of their 
contribution to the general well-being of the community.”27 What Emma must 
learn is a matter of not only content or standards for evaluation, but also of 
personal style as both object and manner of judgment. She must, as Justice 
notes, come to see “flirting and gallantry [as] aggressive tricks of the young that 
mark out their youth,”28 while also preserving her imagination, spiritedness, and 
readiness in sympathetic feeling. In general, Emma’s errors are a matter all at 
once of evaluative standards, misunderstandings of others, and failures of both 
personal style and self-understanding. As Jackson puts it, “her errors involve not 
only Harriet, but all the other major characters, including Mr. Knightley,  (p. 
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121) and most of all, and most unknowingly, herself. The result is chaos and 
confusion.”29
What these apt summary characterizations of Emma’s progress do not yet fully 
capture, however, are, first, the specific structure of the resistance to self- 
understanding that haunts Emma’s character and, second, the complex process 
of confronting and working through this resistance that the novel unfolds.
The core of this resistance is, of course, Emma’s wish to have her own way, 
coupled with her tendency to generate narratives for both herself and others 
that will bring about the states of affairs that she takes to be desirable. She has 
had, after all, the possibility and the habit of “doing just what she liked,” with 
little in the way of parents or governesses to oppose her, and she has been in 
daily control of the considerable material resources of Hartfield (5). Joking with 
Mr. Knightley, she claims to see herself as “a fanciful, troublesome 
creature,” (9), when in fact her view of herself is that she and only she is in a 
position to arrange the affairs of others most effectively and benevolently. The 
very fact that she makes this claim in jest is evidence of how her view of herself 
as benevolent, imaginative, perceptive, and effective has crystallized, forming a 
kind of center of her personality.
Hence it is no surprise that, immediately upon meeting the younger, fair, plump, 
sweet, but somewhat dim Harriet, Emma should resolve: “She [Emma] would 
notice her; she would improve her; she would detach her from bad acquaintance, 
and introduce her into good society; she would form her opinions and her 
manners. It would be an interesting, and certainly a very kind undertaking; 
highly becoming her own situation in life, her leisure, and powers” (20). Harriet 
is here little more than an occasion for Emma to fantasize about the worth and 
pleasantness of her own character and  (p.122) powers.30 This point about 
Emma’s tendencies to fantasy and to approving self-regard is reinforced, as we 
find in the next paragraph that “[w]ith an alacrity beyond the common impulse 
of a spirit which yet was never indifferent to the credit of doing every thing well 
and attentively, with the real good-will of a mind delighted with its own ideas, 
did she [Emma] then do all the honours of the meal, and help and recommend 
the minced chicken and scalloped oysters with an urgency which she knew 
would be acceptable to the early hours and civil scruples of their guests” (20). 
Tellingly, the focus of this description is neither on what Emma does nor on 
whom (if anyone) she in fact benefits, but rather on Emma’s attitudes and self- 
satisfactions in her own performance and its style. For Emma at this point, 
Harriet is less a being of independent worth or interest than she is an occasion 
for Emma to cultivate her own self-regard: “She [Harriet] would be loved as one 
to whom she [Emma] could be useful” (21).
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Given that Emma’s view of herself as benevolent, imaginative, perceptive, and 
effective has crystallized, it will not be easy for her to change, especially since 
she has, as Mr. Knightley observes, “no industry and patience” and, especially, 
no “subjection of the fancy to the understanding,” having been “always quick 
and assured” and “mistress of the house . . . ever since she was twelve” (30). 
Her quickness and self-assurance lead her to fail to appreciate Robert Martin’s 
merits and suitability for Harriet and to decipher Mr. Elton’s courtship riddle but 
to misunderstand it as directed toward Harriet rather than herself (58). Emma is 
in fact determined to persist in her mastery of Hartfield and of those around her. 
She proclaims “very little intention of ever marrying at all,” arguing explicitly 
that “a single woman, of good fortune, is always respectable” and that “mine is 
an active,  (p.123) busy mind with a great many independent resources, and I 
do not perceive why I should be more in want of employment at forty or fifty 
than one-and-twenty” (68, 69). When John Knightley suggests that Mr. Elton may 
be interested in her and that she may inadvertently be encouraging him, she 
dismisses the thought and walks on “amusing herself in the consideration of the 
blunders which often arise from a partial knowledge of circumstances, of the 
mistakes which people of high pretensions to judgment are for ever falling 
into” (89).
When Emma learns she is wrong about Elton and that he has in fact been 
courting her, she admits her error as well as “pain and humiliation,” but she also 
rationalizes her mistake and fails genuinely to question her own character and 
powers of judgment: “She looked back as well as she could; but it was all 
confusion. She had taken up the idea, she supposed, and made everything bend 
to it. His manners, however, must have been unmarked, wavering, dubious, or 
she could not have been so misled” (106). Here Emma primarily regards her 
mistake as, first of all, one of evidential judgment alone, rather than as also a 
function of the fantasies of authority and effect that have led her into error. She 
fails genuinely to question her own character, motives, or powers of judgment in 
general, casting the mistake as a kind of factual error made in light of 
misleading evidence. Austen’s “she supposed” is an especially nice touch, in 
indicating that Emma is taking up a theoretical or exterior stance toward her 
own mistaken judgment, rather than taking responsibility for it as expressing 
her own genuine but flawed character.31 While she forms the resolution “of 
being humble and discreet, and repressing imagination all the rest of her 
life” (112), she also imagines that carrying out this resolution lies in her 
immediate power, without any change of basic character  (p.124) or personality 
on her part. That she expresses this resolution hyperbolically as binding “all the 
rest of her life” shows that it and her self-image remain in the grip of a fantasy 
of superiority. She has, one might say, not yet been genuinely humbled, and her 
“youth and natural cheerfulness” (109), a good night’s sleep, and her propping 
up of her image of herself through her fantasy-tinged resolution are enough to 
restore her spirits, without any fundamental change.
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It is, then, no surprise when in Book II Emma continues to judge that Harriet 
and Robert Martin “must be separated” (147), even after Harriet has revealed 
her genuine feelings for him awkwardly and in an obvious rush of emotion, 
recounting to Emma her meeting with his mother and sisters. Moreover, Emma’s 
fancy is now prompted by Frank Churchill, in whom she finds “nothing to denote 
him unworthy of the distinguished honour which her imagination had given him; 
the honour, if not of being really in love with her, of being at least very near it, 
and saved only by her own indifference” (162). Here Austen blends free indirect 
discourse, thus involving us in Emma’s train of thought and calling attention to 
the fact that she sees herself yet again as an agent in awarding honors, with 
authorial commentary, in hinting via her double-negative and somewhat 
hyperbolic formulation “nothing to denote him unworthy of the distinguished 
honours” that there is something amiss in Emma’s course of thought. 
Unsurprisingly, Emma then goes on, during a party at the Coles’, not only to take 
delight in the thought that “she was [Frank’s] object,” but also that “every body 
must perceive it” (173), thus seeing herself as observed and admired by others 
for her attractiveness and command, rather than herself attending to and taking 
responsibility for her character and comportment. That Emma continues to see 
herself as seen and admired by others is especially marked in her imaginative 
rehearsal of Frank’s courting her, wherein “the conclusion of every imaginary 
declaration on her side was that she refused him” (206), thus maintaining 
control of both her inner life and her external relations,  (p.125) untouched by 
others and confident in her power. Later, when her own flirtations with Frank 
have withered, Emma encourages what she misunderstands to be an attachment 
to Frank on Harriet’s part, continuing to imagine that she might effectively and 
benevolently manage Harriett’s affairs (268–269).
Emma’s tendencies to self-centered, self-reinforcing fantasy about herself as the 
admired, benevolent, and effective manager of the affairs of others become 
explicit and are then explicitly challenged by Knightley at the party on Box Hill, 
when Emma insults Miss Bates by remarking archly that Miss Bates may have “a 
difficulty” in producing “only three [dull things] at once” rather than an 
unlimited number (291). Emma issues this insult in response to Frank’s proposal 
to the party that they should each (besides Emma and himself) produce “either 
one thing very clever, be it prose or verse, original or repeated—or two things 
moderately clever—or three things very dull indeed” (291). About Frank’s 
proposal and Emma’s reaction to it, Mary Poovey insightfully observes that “the 
vanity Frank invites reawakens the ‘original narcissism’ of his auditors [— 
including, especially, Emma—], for implicit in his challenge is the opportunity to 
imagine, for just a moment, that every thought is as precious to one’s listeners 
as to oneself, that one is, in short, the centre of a nonjudgmental little 
universe.”32 Indeed, the prompting of narcissistic fantasy is especially strong in 
Emma, for though she is not herself intended to produce a witty remark, she has 
already been fantasizing about others noticing and admiring her flirtatious 
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command over Frank, she is herself to be the judge of whether any remark 
offered by another is suitably witty, and she is unable to resist the witty jibe at 
Miss Bates. Though she had just teased Frank about the importance of self- 
command (290), she here proves entirely unable to exhibit it herself.
 (p.126) Here Emma’s failures of self-command and benevolent command over 
others are on full display, to others and to herself. Miss Bates blushes, those who 
care for her may be supposed to be quietly aghast—Mr. Weston recalls them to 
the contest, away from Emma’s remark—and, after a short time, Mr. Knightley 
forcefully reproves her in private. Initially, “Emma recollected, blushed, was 
sorry, but tried to laugh it off” (294), but after Knightley presses the point and 
then hands her into her carriage, she finds herself, alone, filled with “anger 
against herself, mortification, and deep concern. . . . Never had she felt so 
agitated, mortified, grieved, at any circumstance in her life” (296). She has been 
forced—by the very figure whose judgment she most values—to confront the 
falsity, at least on this occasion, of her crystallized image of herself as 
benevolent, imaginative, perceptive, and effective.
Unsurprisingly, Emma resolves to do better and to call upon Miss Bates the next 
morning “in the warmth of true contrition” (296). Tellingly, however, she also in 
doing so imagines “that she might see Mr. Knightley in her way; or, perhaps, he 
might come in while she were paying her visit” (297). That is, even while she is 
remorseful, she still wishes to be seen—and especially by Knightley—as in 
appropriate command of her situation. Nonetheless, Emma does now manage to 
check her vanity and to retain her self-command. She remains calm and does not 
interfere as Harriet reveals her interest in marrying Mr. Knightley, despite her 
own sudden realization that “Mr. Knightley must marry no one but 
herself” (320). With composure, she tells Harriet “that Mr. Knightley is the last 
man in the world, who would intentionally give any woman the idea of his feeling 
for her more than he really does,” so that Harriet may have some ground to 
think that her interest might be reciprocated (323).
Caught in contrition and disappointment, Emma finally fully confronts her own 
qualities of character as she reflects on what she has done:
 (p.127)
With insufferable vanity had she believed herself in the secret of 
everybody’s feelings; with unpardonable arrogance proposed to arrange 
everybody’s destiny. She was proved to have been universally mistaken; 
and she had not quite done nothing—for she had done mischief. She had 
brought evil on Harriet, on herself, and she too much feared, on Mr. 
Knightley. (324)
Anticipating Harriet’s marriage to Mr. Knightley, she then finds that
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[t]he only source whence any thing like consolation or composure could be 
drawn, was in the resolution of her own better conduct, and the hope that, 
however inferior in spirit and gaiety might be the following and every 
future winter of her life to the past, it would yet find her more rational, 
more acquainted with herself, and leave her less to regret when it were 
gone. (332)
Matters are at last happily resolved only when Emma reveals to Knightley that 
while she had been flattered by Frank’s attentions, she had never really loved 
him, whereupon Knightley proposes to her, having found, as he puts it, that “one 
sentiment” on his part—jealousy of Frank—had “probably enlightened him as to 
the other”—love for Emma (340).
What are we to make of this resolution? Has Emma changed and earned her 
match with Knightley? And what is the character of that marriage likely to be? 
Critics have been divided over this issue. There is general agreement that Emma 
embodies a number of qualities often thought to be interrelated and to be 
significantly shared among women: imagination, fancy, wit, a desire for male 
admiration, curiosity, and meddlesomeness. Lacking the possibility of making 
herself an independent socioeconomic identity apart from marriage or 
inheritance, her passions and intelligence have been channeled into the 
domestic and village spheres. As Tony Tanner puts it, in bearing  (p.128) 
imaginative energies that she cannot express otherwise, “Emma is a very active 
fantasist, . . . the central eccentric, who is the potentially most disruptive figure 
in the society. . . . She is the danger from within—if, that is—society itself is not 
beginning to seem like the danger from without.”33 From a traditionalist point of 
view, then, Emma deserves chastening and requires control, both of which are 
provided by Mr. Knightley, in order to fit appropriately into the regnant social 
order. In Alasdair Duckworth’s formulation, “Emma in the end chooses society 
rather than self, an inherited order rather than a spontaneous and improvised 
existence.”34 Claudia L. Johnson adds that this choice “implicitly opposes and 
prefers the orderly, patriarchal, rational, masculine, and, above all, right, to the 
disorderly, subjectivist, imaginative, feminine, and self-evidently wrong.”35 Even 
more sharply, Maaja A. Stewart argues that Emma’s “change [from sole mistress 
of Hartfield to Knightley’s wife], like Elizabeth Bennet’s, is marked by a loss of 
wit and autonomy, as she is disciplined to accept the male gaze. Reality, in the 
form of Austen’s inscription of patriarchy in the novel, refuses to yield to 
Emma’s desires as it educates and immobilizes this most independent of 
heroines firmly in the marriage plot.”36
Other readers, however, have seen Emma as maintaining her independence and 
wit within the framework of the social order, as Mr. Knightley is induced to take 
up residence at Hartfield after marriage, in order to avoid requiring the 
querulous Mr. Woodhouse to move. Johnson argues that
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 (p.129)
the conclusion which seemed tamely and placidly conservative thus takes 
an unexpected turn, as the guarantor of order himself [—Mr. Knightley—] 
cedes a considerable portion of the power which custom has allowed him 
to expect. In moving to Hartfield, Knightley is sharing her home, and in 
placing himself within her domain, Knightley gives his blessing to her rule. 
Emma assumes her own entitlement to independence and power—power 
not only over her own destiny, but, what is harder to tolerate, power over 
the destinies of others—and in doing so she poaches on what is felt to be 
male turf. . . . In its willingness to explore positive versions of female 
power, Emma is itself an experimental production of authorial 
independence unlike any of Austen’s other novels.37
Patricia Meyer Spacks adds that “Emma has kept herself alive while all around 
decayed, kept herself alive with the energies of gossip. . . . As a sub-text for the 
major line of narrative [gossip] supports the imaginative and improvisational, 
valuing the private, implying the saving energies of female curiosity and female 
volubility, celebrating the possibility and the importance of a narrative of trivia. 
It exemplifies the subversive resources of the novel as genre.”38
Depending on which reading one favors, then, Emma either subordinates her 
imaginative energies to the requirements of social life (appropriately or not), or 
persists in them and retains some control over her affairs. Here the correct 
things to say are, first, that we just don’t know which is decisively the case; 
second, that the novel ends by suspending us in this very uncertainty; and third, 
that Emma’s achievements in self-understanding and in marrying Mr. Knightly 
are  (p.130) best regarded as both genuine and partial.39 The last sentence of 
the novel is, “But, in spite of these deficiencies—[viz. Mrs. Elton judged the 
wedding ‘all extremely shabby, and very inferior to her own’—], the wishes, the 
hopes, the confidence, the predictions of the small band of true friends who 
witnessed the ceremony, were fully answered in the perfect happiness of the 
union” (381). As Poovey aptly notes, this last sentence “has the effect of robbing 
the future of its potential for change, for its temporal stasis freezes the 
Knightleys’ marriage in an eternal repetition of their ‘perfect happiness.’ ”40 Or 
perhaps not: for this freeze-frame ending not only stops the dynamics of Emma’s 
and Knightley’s relationship, but also leaves their happiness slightly qualified. 
Just who composes “the small band of friends”? —Mrs. and Mr. Weston, perhaps; 
but how reliable is their judgment? Exactly what were their wishes, hopes, 
confidence, and predictions? Austen’s art and genius here is to have presented 
character—that is, virtues and vices—as essentially existing in courses of their 
change and development, including experiences of humiliation and 
embarrassment,41 and then to have cut that development off. This not only 
forces readers to speculate about the protagonists’ futures and to entertain 
ambiguities, it also reminds us that character and self-understanding remain 
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things for which these figures will be responsible, with nothing settled 
absolutely and with crystallization and emotion always in play.
 (p.131) Philosophy typically seeks standing terms for assessment—here for 
describing and assessing the achievement of self-understanding and worldly 
success—from its own more dispassionate, spatialized, and generalization- 
seeking point of view. It offers useful standing terms for assessing which 
characters understand themselves and their situations and so act well, and 
which do not. In contrast, Austen’s concern as a novelist for dramatic 
presentation over time rightly discloses complexities and responsibilities that 
attach to self-understanding as an ongoing, unclosed, and socially situated 
process that is suffused with feeling. Her presentation in free indirect discourse 
of Emma’s streams of thought about herself and others, qualified by adverbial 
phrases that express ironic authorial evaluations (“highly becoming,” “nothing to 
denote him unworthy”) show the complexity, temporality, partiality, and 
elusiveness of self-understanding. Emma has somewhat curbed her tendencies 
to self-centered vanity and meddlesome plotting—she did not attempt to block 
Harriet’s interest in Knightley, and she accepts the standing role of a wife—but 
she also retains her wit and her interest in self-management and the 
management of others. Philosophers would do well, like Emma, to register the 
complexities of self-understanding and self-management, without quite 
abandoning address to them. Even if self-understanding in general has standing 
appropriate objects or targets (motivations, temperaments, qualities of 
character, interests, desires, and so on), it is both a social and emotional process 
that we do not fully control as individuals and something also always to be 
achieved, as Austen compellingly demonstrates in the figure of Emma. Given the 
social situations, the emotion-laden characters, and the needs for imaginative 
narrative rehearsal that may always be structured by crystallized vanity that 
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Notes:
(1.) James Edward Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen, ed. R. W. Chapman 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 159.
(2.) Arguments about the incoherence of introspectionist self-knowledge of 
thought contents, itself conceived as primitive, immediate, and infallible, are 
legion, those of Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle, and Sellars being 
among the most prominent.
(3.) Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), vii.
(4.) Ibid., viii.
(5.) Matthew Boyle, “Critical Study: Cassam on Self-Knowledge for Humans,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (June 2015): 337–348, at 341. Boyle is 
building on and defending Richard Moran’s work on one’s commitments, 
including one’s beliefs, as things over which one normally has authority in his 
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2001).
(6.) This point is well developed by T. M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Other 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000), and it has a long tradition within 
Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy in the treatment of the relation between 
Willkür (choice) and Wille (the moral law, a fundamental norm of rational 
willing).
(7.) Arguably, this kind of overemphasis appears in Sartre in both Being and 
Nothingness and “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” where Sartre mistakenly holds 
that something being a reason at all for me and a course of life being meaningful 
for me are things that are altogether within my personal power simply to decide.
(8.) See J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” in Austin, Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175–204.
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(9.) To his great credit, Moran does not ignore this topic, as he treats the cases 
of Fred Vincy in George Eliot’s Middlemarch and John Lewis in Kingsley Amis’s 
That Uncertain Feeling as instances of (culpable) failure to exercise agentive 
powers in taking responsibility for one’s commitments—an all too human 
possibility. Sartre begins to discuss the conditioning of the exercise of agentive 
powers in his discussion of seriality in his Critique of Dialectical Reason.
(10.) Richard Jenkyns, A Fine Brush on Ivory: An Appreciation of Jane Austen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164. Like Emma, Elizabeth Bennet, too, 
must learn to see through the passive-aggressive manipulativeness of her father. 
See Richard Eldridge, On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism, 
and Self-Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 168–172.
(11.) Gilbert Ryle, “Jane Austen and the Moralists,” The Oxford Review, no. 1, 
1966; reprinted in Ryle, Critical Essays: Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1971), 286–301, at 299–300. Ryle traces this presentation of fully 
rounded characters to Austen’s having an Aristotelian moral sensibility, more 
oriented toward flexible contextual judgments of character than to moral 
principle, transmitted and modified for a modern English context by Shaftesbury, 
in contrast with the implacable, intolerant, and implausible moral stance of 
eighteenth-century English Calvinism, which saw characters as entirely black or 
entirely white, entirely good or entirely evil, entirely elect or entirely damned.
(12.) Ibid., 291, 297. Ryle’s reference here to the need for “genuine good will” as 
a central virtue suggests both a compatibility with a flexible, naturalized 
Kantianism and the continuing influence of a broad-minded liberal Christianity 
in Austen’s views, in addition to the Shaftesburyean Aristotelianism that he 
otherwise ascribes to her.
(13.) Richard Moran aptly suggests, especially in his discussion of Fred Vincy in 
Middlemarch that taking up a theoretical stance on one’s own commitments and 
actions is itself motivated by a wish to evade responsibility for them (Authority 
and Estrangement, 188–192). That wish may be a natural one for beings 
freighted with reflective awareness. But exactly how does it arise and how does 
it take on force in one’s conduct? Not everyone is as feckless in action as Fred.
(14.) Notoriously, when asked whether he ever read novels, Ryle is reported to 
have replied, “Oh, yes—all six of them, every year.”
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(19.) Ibid., 182.
(20.) Ibid.
(21.) This is one reason why what contemporary psychology addresses under the 
heading of impression management, often involving pretense and prejudice, is 
unavoidable: we judge ourselves initially as others judge us.
(22.) Ibid., 193–194.
(23.) Ibid., 195. In Nausea, Sartre similarly criticizes the vain effort “d’attraper 
le temps par le queue [to catch time by the tail]” (La Nauseé, [Paris: Gallimard, 
1938], 66), and the difference between self-knowledge, which is always 
incomplete and open to change, and knowledge of objects is a principal theme of 
Being and Nothingness.
(24.) Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 165–166. Compare also “A person leads his life at a crossroads: at 
the point where a past that has affected him and a future that lies open meet in 
the present” (31). The occasion for renewed assessment is when this moment of 
the crossing of past with future is also a moment of breakdown of smooth and 
successful action.
(25.) Ibid., 59.
(26.) Karin Jackson, “The Dilemma of Emma: Moral, Ethical, and Spiritual 
Values,” Persuasions: The Jane Austen Journal Online 21, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 
http://www.jasna.org/persuasions/on-line/vol21no2/jackson.html.
(27.) George Justice, “Introduction,” in Emma, ed. George Justice, 4th ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2012), xvii.
(28.) Ibid., xxvi.
(29.) Jackson, “The Dilemma of Emma.”
(30.) Here Austen’s use of free indirect discourse puts us inside Emma’s course 
of reflection, while her formulation “highly becoming” ironically highlights and 
criticizes Emma’s vanity.
(31.) This passage is another striking example of the use of free indirect 
discourse for which Austen is justly famous, especially so in Emma, a novel 
about repeatedly compromised efforts at self-understanding.
(32.) Mary Poovey, “The True English Style,” Persuasions: The Jane Austen 
Journal 5 (1983): 10–12, at 10.
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(33.) Tony Tanner, Jane Austen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1986), 189.
(34.) Alasdair Duckworth, Improvement of the Estate (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971), 148.
(35.) Claudia L. Johnson, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 122.
(36.) Maaja A. Stewart, Domestic Relations and Imperial Fictions: Jane Austen’s 
Novels in Eighteenth Century Contexts (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1993), 141.
(37.) Claudia L. Johnson, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel, 143, 125, 
126.
(38.) Patricia Meyer Spacks, Gossip (New York: Random House, 1985), 171.
(39.) James Austen-Leigh informs us, when asked about Emma’s future, that Jane 
Austen would reply “that Mr. Woodhouse survived his daughter’s marriage, and 
kept her from settling at Donwell, about two years,” but we do not learn from 
her reports anything more than this. Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen, 
119.
(40.) Poovey, 12.
(41.) Richard Simpson usefully notes that Austen “contemplates virtues, not as 
fixed quantities, or as definable qualities, but as continual struggles and 
conquests, as progressive states of mind, advancing by repulsing their 
contraries, or losing ground by being overcome. . . . A character therefore 
unfolded itself to her . . . as a dramatic sketch, a living history, a composite 
force, which could exhibit what it was by exhibiting what it did.” Simpson, “Jane 
Austen,” North British Review, April 1870; reprinted in Jane Austen: The Critical 
Heritage, ed. B. S. Southam (London: Routledge, 1968), 249–250.
(42.) Unless, of course, social life becomes systematically and transparently just, 
with neither need nor occasion for the sort of impression management that is 
infused with pretense and prejudice—surely not a likely state of affairs.
